1. Introduction

The two major obstacles encountered by a scholar considering the work of Neohellenic philosophers of the 15th century are, on the one hand, a lack of up-to-date editions of most of their writings and, on the other, the fact that in the specific case of certain treatises, such as the *Laws* (Νόμων Συγγραφή) of Georgios Gemistos, the text that has been preserved to our era is fragmentary and therefore incomplete. Moreover, even though the current research and bibliography on the subject cannot be regarded as sufficient, diverse lines of elucidating 15th-century Greek texts have already been drawn and...
the need for a coherent and amalgamated understanding of the texts has already become apparent and is under concern. Additionally, the exact degree to which 15th-century Greek texts were reflecting the ideas of Western European late mediaeval and early Renaissance philosophy has not been investigated yet, either as direct translations or in the form of assuming someone’s alleged thought and expanding on his primary wording and notions.

At the same time, a contemporary scholar must, within the framework of his research, pay tribute and respect to particular and at their time groundbreaking approaches, which have marked modern research on the subject under consideration. Such was the dissertation entitled *Georgius Gemistus Pletho’s Criticism of Plato and Aristotle* by John Wilson Taylor, who should be regarded as the first scholar who has attempted to come up with a coherent chart presenting the Greek scholars of the 15th century involved in the dispute over the priority of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, although it was insufficient due to the limited primary sources employed.³ In this paper, following a memorable form of inquiry set by him in a paper reflecting on Cardinal Bessarion⁴ and adopting a textual approach similar to the technique of working with text quotations and excerpts introduced by David Konstan,⁵ I will attempt, after giving a bibliographically detailed account of the scholars and treatises involved in the 15th-century controversy on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, to present specific traces of Plethon’s view

³ Taylor, J. W., *Georgius Gemistus Pletho’s Criticism of Plato and Aristotle*. Menasha, The Collegiate Press 1921, p. 19. This controversy should be thought of now more in the sense of a comparatio, namely of comparative assessments, and less in the sense of a persistent duration in the case of each individual scholar and coherent in argumentation dispute. The accuracy of the diagram suggested by Taylor on page 19 of his treatise is still open to further elaboration, minor corrections and additions, as a great number of texts are (a) still either unedited, or (b) have not been yet thoroughly studied, and (c) the chronological order of many of the writings involved in the dispute has not yet been established.

⁴ Idem, Bessarion the Mediator. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 55, 1924, pp. 120–127. Following the example of G. W. Taylor, I have translated here in English the Greek texts presented on the occasion of this paper.

⁵ Konstan, D., Excerpting as a Reading Practice. In: Reydams-Schils, G. (ed.), *Thinking Through Excerpts. Studies on Stobaeus*. Tournhout, Brepols 2011, pp. 9–22. It is worth noting that working with excerpts, as also working with extracts and quotations taken from treatises the full content of which is sometimes lost, is a process similar to working with pieces of philosophical correspondence or partially edited text. It is not a matter of just selecting, ordering, copying and pasting certain references in view of some fresh re-coordination of their content, but rather a technique and practise of reconsidering philosophical conceptions and their associations – a technique taken out from the same ancient toolbox in which abridgements, synopses, compendia and epitomes are also included, in an attempt to open a new window on the transmission of a cultural heritage.
of sense perception, and of the reaction to it by two of his main adversaries, Cardinal Bessarion and Georgios Scholarios.

2. The controversy on Plato and Aristotle

Georgios Gemistos (ca. 1360–1452), also known under the pen name ‘Plethon’, was a Platonic philosopher who taught in Constantinople, Mistras and Florence. Under his influence, Cosimo del Medici is said to have established the Platonic Academy of Florence, through which Western European thought became acquainted with Plato’s philosophical tenets. A major figure in the revival of Hellenic identity in the collective consciousness of the Greeks.


Plethon associated the political shrinkage of the Byzantine Empire with the doctrines of Orthodox theology. Moreover, he regarded the attempts to form a unified Christian Church, made in the course of the Ferrara-Florence Council (1438–1439), as a commercialised sophistry, aiming at political profit, not at the pursuit of truth. Hence, he attempted to construct a comprehensive philosophical and theological system, based on Neoplatonic philosophy and incorporating features of Zoroastrianism. In his treatise entitled Laws (Νόμων Συγγραφή) he attributed the power and the means for the recovery of the Greek nation to Divine Providence. Within this conception and acting as a quasi-precursor of the Age of Reason, he resorted to a system of universal theism – a novel conception of a universal religion, involving features of lamblichus’s and Proclus’s syncretic mysticism, in which God is the central notion and piety (θεοσέβεια) is the principal virtue, by means of which one may assimilate oneself with God. In response to Plethon, Cardinal Bessarion (1403–1472), his former disciple in the School of Philosophy at Mistras and a dedicated reader of Aquinas, primary Bishop of Nicea, Latinorum Graecissimus and Graecorum Latinissimus, held that the subject issue posed by Plethon is explicable only with respect to the theory of ideas and that Plethon’s objections against Aristotle derived from his own endorsement of the Platonic theory of ideas. Additionally, Bessarion proposed that Plethon’s conception, stated in his treatise De fato (Περὶ εἱμαρμένης), viz. that causality should be thought of as belonging

Ceadle, M. P., The Vision of Light in Ezra Pound’s The Unwobbling Pivot. Twentieth-Century Literature, 35, 1989, No. 2, p. 120.
9 Τατάκη, Β. Ν., Η Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία, Αθήνα, Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας, 1977, p. 263.
11 For the later development of θεοσέβεια under the influence of deism and within the scope of Greek Enlightenment, cf. Καΐρη, Θ., Πνευτική. Στοιχεία Φιλοσοφίας. Εδ. Ν. Σινιόσογλου, Άνδρος, Εύρασια-Καίριος Βιβλιοθήκη, 2008. Καζολέα-Ταβουλάρη, Π., Θεόφιλος Καΐρης. Από τη Φιλοσοφική Ψυχολογία στη Θεοσεβική Ήθική, Αθήνα, Τυπωθήτω, 2005.
13 Keller, A., Two Byzantine Scholars and Their Reception in Italy, op. cit., p. 363. On the discussion upon the the De Fato treatise cf. Taylor, G. W., Tehdore Gaza’s De Fato, University of Toronto Studies. Philological Series, 7, Toronto, 1925.
to the advanced and superior level of ideas in comparison with empirical data, should not be accepted.

3. Textual testimonies on sense perception

Pending Plethon’s view upon sense perception, one has to admit that, for him, the relationship between theology and the world of our senses is established as the deity moves the higher part of the soul, which participates in the deity and subsequently moves the lower part of the soul. On this conception Plethon based the relationship of physics to theology, by which physics may become excellent. Within the framework of an absolute theism and an unconditional idealism, the problem for Plethon was that Aristotle seemed to have disregarded God as the creative force, favouring a discussion of the virtues and failing to introduce immortality of the soul. In this view, Aristotle would be regarded as a strict materialist, while Plethon preferred to resort to Zoroastrianism, as initially introduced in Greece by Pythagoras. Plethon’s treatise on the shortcomings of Aristotle’s philosophy in comparison with the philosophy of Plato, in which Plethon declared Plato to be the superior philosopher of Greek antiquity and qualified Aristotle as ignorant in the most vital issues, was eventually refuted by Georgios Scholarios (1405–1472) in his treatise Against the Questions of Plethon to Aristotle.

It is literally a pity and a misfortune that a whole chapter entitled “On the senses and their particulars” (Περὶ αἰσθήσεων τε καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑκάστας) of Plethon’s treatise Laws has not been preserved in the manuscript tradition of his works. Consequently, one is obliged to restrict, at least at this primary level of research, the scope of such an inquiry to the partial references on the subject made by Plethon, as they are found in various parts of his treatises. In the 6th chapter of his treatise De Platonicae et Aristotelicae Philosophiae Differentia (Περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται) Plethon notes:

The character of the Greek text in the extracts quoted from this point and thereafter is enigmatic in itself and on several occasions dubious. These attributes had to be preserved in the English translation so as to defend the polysemy of the content, the ambiguity of which had raised in the 15th c. a great deal of troubles for Plethon and his colleagues.
And yet it would not be right for him to say that it is possible for the sensible, which is prior in time, to belong to the function of sense perception (αἰσθήσεως), against the well-posed universal reason, namely that it would be necessary for those in reference and in relation to coalesce at the same time (ἅμα εἶναι). (And this is so) because, if sense perception could not be established at any time, how could something perceptible via the senses subsist without it, how can it be perceived when sense perception is not present, or is not about to be present? And if sense perception is to be or become present at some future point of time, it is obvious that it becomes present out of the possibility of being present. Thus, the possible object of sense perception will be both a potency of the object to be perceived and also something referred to sense perception.

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19 The reference, here mentioned in italics, is a hyperonym and has the meaning of the Greek technical term anaphora, conceived not just as employed in Greek oratory but within the broader philosophical scope of Greek thought. Traditionally contrasted to deixis and nowadays contrasted to cataphora or backwards anaphora, as in the case of the sentence If he is lucky, John will win, anaphora is that layer of syncategorematic function in wording which, while falling within the broader category of relation, describes a logical relation between the essence and the attribute of it. For the character and linguistic problems related to anaphora in classical Greek, cf. Kiparsky, P., Greek Anaphora in Cross-Linguistic Perspective, Journal of Greek Linguistics, 12, 2012, No. 1, pp. 84–117. On the place of anaphora in the modern logical analysis, in which it is treated (as also tense, adverbial modification, identity, definite description, propositional attitude verbs, indexicality and modality) as a logical form, cf. Lamarque, P. V. – Asher, R. E., Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language. Pergamon, B. P. C. Wheatons, p. 23. The crucial point in the case of reference as anaphora is to understand that in the core of the act of noting something by making a reference there is also denoted a syncategorematic element of ellipsis. On the syncategorematic function of reference within the discussion of universals cf. Růžička, M., Some Marginal Notes on Polarity and Negation. Brno Studies in English, 25, 1999, pp. 43–57.
perception as a potency, and also the potency of sense perception will be referred to the potency of the object to be perceived; also, issues that do not subsist have no actual (ἐνεργίᾳ) priority relating them to each other, but that is possible before their substantiation as actualities. And consequently, it would never be possible for an object of sense perception to become perceptible prior to sense perception itself.

The key term of this passage is Plethon’s conception of universal reason as outlined a little earlier:

Παραπλήσιον δ’ αυτῷ κάκειν, τὸ τὸ μὲν καθόλου τῇ ὑλῇ φάσκειν ἀνάλογων ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος εἶδει. Τούναντίον γὰρ ἂν ἀπαν εἴη, εἰ γε ὅλον μὲν τί τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος μέρος. Τὸ δ’ εἰδὸς πανταχῇ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μᾶλλον ἣ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι, καὶ ἐνεργίᾳ δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ κατὰ μέρος. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καθόλου ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβανόμενον, αὐτὸ τε ἐνεργίᾳ ἔστι καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀπαντὰ ἐνεργία περιέχει· τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος αὐτὸ μὲν ἐνεργία ἔστι, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐ καθόλου ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ὅσον μόνον κάκεινον ἑαυτῷ προσήκει. Καὶ τέλειον μὲν τί τὸ καθόλου, ἀτελὲς δὲ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.

It is in the same way, to say (Aristotle) that the universal has some correspondent to matter and that the particular has some correspondent to species. But everything could be conceived contrary to this statement, if, of course, the universal is an entirety and the particular is a partiality, since the species is in every case to be conceived in entirety rather than in partiality and since it is the universal rather than the particular which is (to be conceived) as active (ἐνεργίᾳ). [And this may be accepted] because the universal as taken into consideration conclusively on these issues, it is both an actuality (ἐνεργίᾳ) and an inclusive of all particular partialities; and the partial itself is an actuality on the one hand, while the universal is universal in itself only insofar as it refers to itself. And the universal is perfect, while the partial is incomplete.

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20 It is preferable and, I believe, more accurate to render καθόλου λόγος as universal reason, considering καθόλου as an adverbial adjective and not just simply as an adjective, rather than as simply a general statement, because of the context of the reference quoted, of the polysemy of λόγος in the Greek language, and of the comprehensive and all-encompassing meaning of καθόλου.

21 Ibid.
An immediate reply to Plethon’s proposals came from Cardinal Bessarion in his treatise *In Calumniatorem Platonis*, in which he stated that what is in issue here is species, matter and privation considered as natural principles (ἀρχαὶ). Following Aristotle, he explained that Aristotle’s species corresponds to Plato’s notion of ungenerated and indestructible (ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον), differentiating also between noetic entities (νοητὸν ὂν) and proper entities (κυρίως ὂν), between sensible objects, natural principles (φυσικαὶ ἀρχαὶ) and elements (στοιχεῖα). What was αἰσθητὸν for Plethon was mainly what Bessarion explained as follows:

[...] τὸν αἰσθητὸν τούτον καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστα ἄνθρωπον οὐκ αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγοντες, ἀλλὰ τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ αὐτοανθρώπου ἄνθρωπον εἶναι [...]26

[...] it is not the conception of man, as a natural species, in the meaning of the separable (χωριστὸν) and in the sense of a compound material entity reducible to something immaterial and simple, but it is the share in the humanity of each individual person.

This conception of man as a compound entity refers to the content and the tradition of Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, where the soul is essentially (οὐσιωδός) comprised of nous, as a potency (δυνάμει) and an actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), where potency replaces matter and actuality replaces species. And as corporeal entities are comprised of matter and species perceptible via the senses, in the same way separated substances (χωρισταὶ οὐσίαι), apart from the prime one, are comprised by the potency and actuality of the nous in the sense of the *out of which* noetic matter and species or form. Bessarion quotes Averroes, according to whom, “[...] as the object perceptible by the senses is divided into matter and form (or species), in the same way that which is a noetic entity (τὸ νοητὸν εἶναι) is in the same way divisible into something assimilating matter and something assimilating form (or species).”

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22 Mohler, L., op. cit., II, ch. 6.
23 Ibid., 1.6.2.1–3.
24 Ibid., 1.6.2.11–12.
25 Ibid., 2.12.5.1.
26 Ibid., 3.3.1.20.
27 Ibid., 3.22.11.5.
29 Ibid.
Then, referring not to man and his definition but to the world as a sense-perceptible totality (αἰσθητὸν κόσμον), Bessarion argues\textsuperscript{31} that Plethon's conception of the tangible and feasible world as an image of the mental cosmos would lead to the conclusion that mental essences (νοηταὶ οὐσίαι) would necessary admit of origination and corruption, which should be viewed as absolutely false:

[..] εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα εἶναι τοῦ νοητοῦ πάντα
τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι δέ, ἐπεται πάντως καὶ φθαρτὸν
τι εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ ὠσπερ ἐνταῦθα. καὶ ὠσπερ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ κόσμῳ
τὰ μόρια τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἂει συμπαραμένουσι τοῖς ἀτομικοῖς αὐτῶν
εἰδεσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰς εἰς δυνάμει πρὸς ἄλλο εἶδος διὰ τὸ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος μὴ
ἐχειν πᾶσαν τὴν τοῦ εἴδους τελειότητα, οὔτω κἀν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐπειδὴ
ἐστὶν πλείον τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους ἃτομα, τὰ μόρια ἐκεῖνα τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἂν
συμπαραμένειν ἂεὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν εἰδεσι δύναντο διὰ τὸ ἑκάστους αὐτῶν
τὴν ὅλην τοῦ εἴδους ἁπὰρ ἐπερεχεῖσθαι τελειότητα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄν ἐτέρου
εἴδους ἂεὶ ἐφιέμενα. καὶ ταύτῃ γενητὰς εἶναι καὶ φθαρτὰς ἀνάγκη τὰς
νοητὰς οὐσίας κατὰ τὸν νέον τούτον φιλόσοφον.\textsuperscript{32}

[..] if there should be that, for having the sense-perceptible world standing as an image of the noetic one, everything in the sense-perceptible world must subsist also in the noetic one, it follows that there must be something corruptible in itself, as is the case here. And precisely as the particles of matter in the sense-perceptible world cannot all the time stay adherent to their own individual species, but they are potencies referred to a different species, as that kind of species does not have the full perfection of (a) species, even in the noetic world, since a greater number of individual (particulars) of the same species subsist there, those particles of matter could not stay adherent continuously to their own species, because the whole perfection of (their) species cannot be included in each of them, but they are brought upon a different species. And in this way it is (shown as) necessary, according to this young philosopher, that the noetic essences admit of generation and corruption.

As Bessarion explains, one is to realise that the whole being is complemented by the nous, the soul and body, that soul is the medium between the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 3.24.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 3.24.1.19.
intellect and the material body, having its essence as mediating, its assets (ἰδιότηται) eternal in its essence and timely active in its actualities, giving the sense of an essence both indivisible and divisible: the soul of being (or cosmos) indivisible as an image of the noetic universe, divisible in the paradigmatic (exemplary) forms of perception.33

Perhaps the most detailed reaction to Plethon's statements on sense perception is to be found in the writings of Georgios Scholarios. For him, the solution to this problem is Aristotle's division of essence into primary and secondary substance, differentiating on the nature of the essence's qualitative attributes (ἰδιότητες): not everything coalesces with each other in accordance with nature, but only those co-subsist and co-testify the truth of each other, in which there is a two-sided, mutual and permanent order, equally in reason referred and really dependable on each other. Because, Aristotle claimed, of the things referred to, some have being as their object of reference and others have their object of reference in the wording of the reference – two cases following diverse ratios. In Scholarios's own words:

ο Πλήθων … εἰπῶν γάρ, φησί, περὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, ὅτι ἃμα εἰσὶ τῇ φύσει, κακὰς ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητὸν δύναται χρόνῳ πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἶναι· ἀδύνατον γάρ, φησίν, εἶναι τι αἰσθητὸν, μήτε οὖσης αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεως, μήτε δυναμένης εἶναι· ὡστε εἰ τινὸς αἰσθητοῦ ἡ αἰσθήσεως δυνατή ἔστι, καὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμει αἰσθητόν ἔστι, καὶ ἃμα τε ἔστιν αὐτὸ δυνάμει αἰσθητόν, μήτε ὀυσίας τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἡ δυνάμη αἰσθήσεως αὐτοῦ μήπω ἐνεργεία ὄντος ὑπὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει. Καὶ αὖθις ἐπειδὰν θάτερον ἐνεργεία ἡ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστι, καὶ ἃμα εἰσίν ἀμφὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδέτερον πρότερον, ἢ ὑστερον.34

Plethon [...] was mistaken in concluding that it is possible for the sense-perceptible to be prior to sense perception. Because it is impossible, he says, for something to be perceived by the senses without the presence of sense-perception itself or the potentiality of it becoming present; thus, if the perception of a perceptible is possible, this means that the perceptible is potentially perceptible, and at the same time it is perceptible as a potentiality, namely without the actuality of its perception, and that

33 Ibid., 4.15.2.1–19.
its potentiality of being perceived is not yet actualised by the senses. And [i.e., Plethon] states that whenever one of the two cases is actualised, the other is also actualised; thus they are to be conceived as being both active and thus neither of them is prior or posterior to the other.

4. Conclusion

As obvious in this passage, Scholarios’s contribution to Neohellenic philosophy and Aristotelian studies is paramount, mainly because of the apparent clarity with which he treats such complex issues. Testifying that “as the awareness of the conceptual begins with the knowledge of the sense-perceptible, we conduct the names employed in sense perceptible awareness towards an intellectual cognizance”, he aligns himself with Aristotle, who noted that the man perceiving something via his senses is somehow making a judgement and with Leon Magentinus (1300-1399), who in rephrasing Aristotle’s observation admitted of sense perception as a form of judging. In Scholarios’s wording the object of this conduct (μεταφορά) is identical with the assets or attributes (ἰδιότητες) mentioned also by Bessarion.

For the Neohellenic philosophy, the fundamental and ultimate issue under scrutiny as for the sense and/or intellectually perceptible object of awareness is the issue of the Neohellenic identity and self-identification of the Greeks – an issue utterly dissimilar to that of “national identity” and of the evolvement of a national consciousness, and also a theme quite chaotic in its contemporary interpretations and semantic intermingling of the terms ἔθνος (nation), γένος (genus) and φυλή (clan). These terms are often misconceived and confused with each other, always disregarding the philosophical background of the term γένος when referred to the genus of the Greeks or Hellenes, making its sense less tangible and feasible and, consequently, disregarding the interrelation between γένος and αἴσθησις within the broader scope of the “Neohellenic identity” subject – an enduring requisite of the

35 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὴν γνώσιν τῶν νοερῶν ἁρικνούμεθα, καὶ τῆς αἰσθητής γνώσεως τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὴν νοητὴν μεταφέρομεν γνῶσιν, Epitome Summae Contra Gentiles Thomae Aquinae, 3, 53,7–8.
36 Topica, 1111a19.
Greek culture. It is in this spirit that Scholarios’s view of sense perception may be highly appreciated and may be considered as more venerable, when compared to the view of many of his contemporaries and many of our contemporary scholars.

**ABSTRACT**

In *Categories* 7b36–38 Aristotle prioritized the object of sense perception over the act of perception itself, observing that the withdrawal of the perceptible (αἰσθητόν) entails the cancelation of perception (αἴσθησις), while the removal of the act of perception leaves the perceptible subsisting. This last point was enough for Plethon to initiate his own critique, advocating that Aristotle did not seem to have endeavoured a solid coalescence between the problems raised in his theory of knowledge and the issues elaborated in his *Metaphysics*.

In an attempt to present these two fields of inquiry as in greater harmony with each other and to shed light on what he considered to be the weak points and contradictions of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, Plethon claimed that Aristotle’s view seemed to disprove his own vision of καθόλου λόγος, especially insofar as the category of relation (πρὸς τι) is involved. Plethon conceived of relation as of the simultaneous and necessary character of the natural concurrence (ἅμα τῇ φύσει, *Cat.*, 14 b 27–28) between the act of perception and its object. Thus, for him, Aristotle’s approach should be thought of as false or, at least, as inadequate; first, because an object and an act of perception must always concur naturally and, second, because, in accordance with *Metaphysics* 1010 b 30–32 and *De anima* 425 b 25, if sensible perception (αἴσθησις) is not sustained or is withdrawn, the object (αἰσθητόν) of a non-subsisting sense perception cannot subsist. On the other hand, if sense perception is to subsist in the future, it is obvious that it will appear out of something potentially subsisting (δυνάμει υπάρχον). Thus, for Plethon, the object of sense perception is both the potentially perceptible (δυνάμει αἰσθητόν) and perception in relation to its potency (πρὸς δυνάμει αἴσθησις).

**Keywords:** Plethon, Bessarion, Scholarios, sense perception