In this paper, I take up the theory of beings of reason from Rodrigo de Arriaga SJ (1592–1667) and provide some context for preliminary assessment of its significance. In five sections I analyse his views about the nature, the existence, causes, God’s relation to, and the division of beings of reason. We will see that in many ways Arriaga’s discussion is just derived from the original ideas of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza SJ (1578–1641), who is assumed to be his philosophy teacher in Valladolid, and who placed the concept of error at

1 Arriaga was born in Logroño, Spain. In 1606 he joined the Jesuits and studied in Salamanca and Valladolid. In 1625 he settled in Prague where he spent the rest of his life. For many years he was the Rector of the Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague. He also published an (almost) complete series of theological textbooks, Disputationes theologicae (1643–1655). In Bohemia, as it was shown by Stanislav Sousedík, he was the focal thinker who prompted great local development of philosophy and theology at the time. But he was well-known not only in Bohemia and within scholastic circles but world-wide. “Pierre Bayle calls him ‘refined and penetrating’, and ‘a Genius’.” (The Dictionary Historical and Critical: The Second Edition. London, Knapton et al. 1734, p. 506; the first French edition was published in 1697). For pioneering work on Arriaga, see Eschweiler, K., Roderigo de Arriaga. Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, 3, 1931, p. 253–286. For the groundbreaking collective monograph on various aspects of Arriaga’s life thought, see Saxlová, T. – Sousedík, S., Rodrigo de Arriaga († 1667), Philosoph und Theologe. Praha, Karolinum 1998. (Reviewed by Novotný, D. D., Rodrigo de Arriaga († 1667), Philosoph und Theologe. Acta Commeniana, 14, 2000, p. 239–243). Thanks to Bayle and Sousedík, there is a modest but continuous interest in Arriaga, see e.g. Armogathe, Jean-Robert. Dubium Perfectissimum: The Skepticism of the “Subtle Arriaga”. In: Maia Neto, J. R. (ed.), Skepticism in Renaissance and post-Renaissance thought: New interpretations. Amherst, NY, Humanity Books, 2004, p. 107–121.

the centre of the theory. Arriaga, however, also defends some non-standard views of his own, such as the claim that all human powers (not just the intellect but senses as well), can make beings of reason. In the revised edition of his major work he also adds some interesting polemical passages that indicate the emergence of the reductionist (or we might say eliminativist) approach to beings of reason, according to which they are not distinct from real beings but reducible to them.

Arriaga deals with beings of reason in his *Cursus philosophicus*, a university textbook containing material covering the usual three-year Jesuit philosophical curriculum, i.e. *Summulae, Logica, Physica, De coelo, De generatione, De anima*, and *Metaphysica* (ethics was taught within moral theology). There are several editions of Arriaga’s *Cursus philosophicus*. The first came out in Antwerp in 1632, followed by several editions in Paris and Lyon, and the last, revised and expanded, was published more than thirty years later, shortly after Arriaga’s death in Lyon in 1669. Arriaga’s *Cursus* is one of the many comprehensive philosophy textbooks published in the Baroque era. The genre seems to be established by Hurtado with his *Universa philosophia*, first published as *Disputationes a summulis ad metaphysicam* in 1615. Many Jesuit and non-Jesuit professors of theology followed the trend and wrote textbooks presenting and defending various nuanced competing views, within the generally acknowledged, although shifting, common ground.


5 One may also give credit for pioneering this genre to Eustache de Saint-Paul (O.Cist.) (1573–1640) for his *Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita* published in 1609. However, this work and its small octavo volumes is somewhat too modest when compared to the impressive quartos or folios of Hurtado, Arriaga and others. Eustachius also lacks ambition to engage in debates over subtle points with his professional colleagues, which is what the best authors in the “big textbook” genre aspired to do, in spite of their concern for pedagogical brevity, simplicity and “uniformity of doctrine”. See also Knebel, S. K., *Erkenntnistheoretisches*, op. cit., p. 50 ff, who considers Arriaga to be the founder of the genre: “Historisch angemessen wäre es charakterisiert als seine freie Variation auf den Philosophiekurs des Rodrigo de Arriaga…; denn dieser bildet die Vorlage.”

6 The research of these textbooks has been unfortunately neglected in spite of their being of great historical and perhaps even systematic philosophical interest. Within the pages of these textbooks the dialectics of innovation and conservation unfolded, addictive to its participants,
Beings of reason are systematically treated by Arriaga on two occasions, first briefly in *Logica* and then extensively in *Metaphysica Disputatio*. The main discussion is given in the latter, since in his view the being of reason is not the object of logic, as the Thomists hold. The Disputation is structured around the following questions:

Section 1: What is the being of reason?
Section 2: Whether there is the being of reason?
    Subsection 1: There is the being of reason.
    Subsection 2: Solution to the objections.
Section 3: What potencies make the being of reason and how?
    Subsection 1: The being of reason is made by every false act.
    Subsection 2: Which being of reason is made by internal senses?
    Subsection 3: What about the external senses and the simple apprehension?
Section 4: Whether God makes the being of reason?
Section 5: How many [kinds of] the being of reason are there?

Between the editions, Arriaga did not substantially modify his views, although, as I have already said, he added some interesting polemical passages. The structure of the Disputation remained identical in both editions. Only the number of the Disputation changed from 6 in the original to 7 in the revised edition as the original Disputation 4 was divided into two, *On substance* and *On subsistence*. In five sections of this paper I shall mostly follow Arriaga's own arrangement of the text.

with newly discovered sub-topics and ever more complex distinctions constantly emerging as one textbook succeeded another. Although this tradition relies heavily on older scholastic texts and may thus be dismissed as a mere “footnote” one may also see in it the climax of previous scholastic thought. The works of this tradition implement strictly systematic ordering, revel in details and indexing, summarize and arbitrate centuries old debates. Some topics are treated with unsurpassed systematicity and comprehensiveness. Though early modern philosophy revolted against this tradition and attempted to ignore or abandon it, it was not quite possible to do so and its concepts, views and methods left their non-negligible traces. (This, however, does not apply with respect to all topics. There is, for instance, a striking contrast concerning the prominence of the topic of *ens rationis* among the scholastics and disregard of it among the non-scholastics of the time, see Knebel, ibid., p. 79.) For excellent essays on post-medieval scholastic textbook tradition see Blum, P. R., *Studies on Early Modern Aristotelianism*. Leiden, Brill 2012.

8 Beings of reason are not the object of logic when understood in the appropriate sense as that which does not have *esse a parte rei* but only a *fictione intellectu*. See Arriaga, ibid. Hurtado deals with the question in a more detailed way in *Universa philosophia* Lugduni, Sumpt. Ludovici Prost 1624, p. 51–57. For the methodological question of the place of beings of reason in metaphysics, see Kobush, T., *Arriagas Lehre vom “Gedankending”*, op. cit., p. 123 ff.
1. Nature: what is the being of reason?

Arriaga opens his discussion of the nature of being of reason in section 1 by distinguishing various meanings of the term ‘ens rationis’, continues with polemics against “the Thomists” and concludes with the definition. Let me in turn deal with these topics.

With respect to the meaning of the term ‘ens rationis’ Arriaga distinguishes between the being of reason as the act of the intellect, which is a real being, and as that “which has no real being but is merely contrived (tantum fictum) by the intellect”, which is not a real being and is the proper topic of the inquiry. Further on, Arriaga also applies the terms “subjective” for the act and “objective” for the object of the act. The two are distinct even when we speak of non-real objects, i.e. beings of reason. In all of these claims Arriaga simply follows Hurtado who, unlike Ockham in his late act-only theory, does not completely abandon act/object distinction.

Arriaga next criticizes “the Thomists” who hold that a being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things; we may call this the extrinsic denomination view of beings of reason. From this it would follow that denominations of being known, genus, species, etc. and in fact all extrinsic denominations are beings of reason. Although many recent thinkers, Arriaga points out, disagree with this, they should not complain about the incoherency of the Thomistic view, because if the being of reason taken “strictly” is something real which posits nothing intrinsic into the denominated subject, which is what they seem to hold, then, of course, all extrinsic denominations are beings of reason. But then they are both real and of reason because

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9 Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1008 (Metaphysica d. 7, s. 1, n. 1).
10 The distinction between subjective/objective can be traced to Scotus, see Novák, L., Scire Deum esse. Scotův důkaz Boží existence jako vrcholný výkon metafyziky jakožto aristoteléské vědy. Praha, Kalich 2011, p. 102–114.
11 “…solum possunt esse entia rationis obiecta actuum, non vero actus ipsi cognoscentes ipsa obiecta, nec denominationes actibus.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 6-7).
13 The view was inspired by Aquinas’s remark “quod ens rationis dicitur, quod cum in re nihil ponat, et in se non sit ens, formatur tamen seu accipitur ut ens in ratione.” Aquinas, T., Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2.
14 Ibid., p. 1008 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 1).
15 “Si enim Thomistae per ens rationis praecise intelligent (ut videntur intelligere) id quod licet in se sit reale, nihil tamen ponit intrinsecum in subjecto denominato, fateor, verissime, eos
cognition is something real. For instance, that I know Peter is something real and hence also that Peter is known by me. Since cognition posits nothing intrinsic into Peter, being known is a being of reason, as well as some extrinsic real being.\(^\text{16}\) We need another anti-Thomistic argument: Either bite the bullet, and acknowledge that all extrinsic denominations, including e.g. being to the right of something, are beings of reason, or give up the claim that a being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things.\(^\text{17}\) The first horn of the dilemma is completely out of step with communis sententia. Moreover, by this doctrine the statement “John is known by me” would make a fiction, whereas “I know John” would not; the two statements, however, differ only verbally and otherwise are identical.\(^\text{18}\) It is true, Arriaga continues, that if we consider being known as something intrinsic to John, it is a being of reason since we conceive it differently than it is. But when we say “John is known” we do not hereby claim that being known is intrinsic to him.\(^\text{19}\) So we are left with the second horn of the dilemma, namely to give up the slogan that a being of reason is that which posits nothing intrinsic into the things. Beings of reason are not extrinsic denominations as such. Some other definition must be found.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{16}\) docere, esse cognitum, genus, speciem, etc. esse entia rationis, neque eis hoc possumus negare, et frustra tunc arguitur.” Ibid., p. 1008 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 2).

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 1008 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 2).

\(^{18}\) “... Ioannem esse a me cognitum, ... est idem ac me cognoscere Ioannem, solumque differunt penes voces activam et passivam; ... sed me cognoscere Ioannem, est aliquid reale ... ergo et Ioannem cognosi a me, erit aliquid reale, licet non intrinsecum Ioanni.” Ibid., p. 1008 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 3).

\(^{19}\) “Fateor, si id iudicaretur ut quid intrinsecum Ioanni, tunc esset quid factum, quia cognoscere-tur aliter ac est in se, hoc autem non sit eo quod dicam illum esse cognitum, ergo non est quid factum, ergo neque ens rationis in hoc sensu.” Ibid., p. 1008 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 3-4).

\(^{20}\) Arriaga also identifies a somewhat different view according to which in all denominations something fictitious is “admixed.” He dismisses this view quickly by appealing to counter-example denominations such as being created that do not involve any fiction (factum). Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, op. cit., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 6). This mixed view was held by John of St. Thomas OP (1589–1644) who argues that in extrinsic denominations something real and of reason “concurs”, see Cursus philosophicus thomisticus ... nunc primum in Germania excerptus ... et ex eiusdem Magistri doctrina illustratus per Thomam de Sarria, Sumpt. Constantini Münich, Coloniae Agrippinae, 1638, p. 34 (The doctrine is adopted by Gredt, J., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-thomisticae. Ed. E. Zenzen. Herder, Barcinoine 1969, p. 124). The mixed view of extrinsic denominations seems to correspond to the resultant extrinsic denomination view of beings of reason, according to which they are just the (necessitated) result of extrinsic denominations. See also Novotný, D. D., Rubio and Suárez: A Comparative Study on the Nature of Entia rationis. In: Čemus, P. (ed.), Bohemia Jesuitica 1556–2006. Praha, Karolinum 2010, p. 484, and Novotný, D. D., Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. New York, Fordham 2013, p. 149–150, incl. notes.
Arriaga’s criticism of the Thomists is just a radical simplification of Hurtado’s intricate arguments. Who are these Thomists on Arriaga’s target? In *Logica* he approvingly adopts the list of Hurtado who gives us the following names: Domingo de Soto OP (1494–1560), Francisco Toledo SJ (1533–1596), Diego Más OP (1553–1608), Antonio Rubio SJ (1548–1615) and “many others who hold this view with” Durand de Saint-Pourçain OP (c. 1275–1334). The selection of names is somewhat idiosyncratic, as well as the label “the Thomists”. Some important proponents of the view should be included, such as Pedro da Fonseca SJ (1528–1599), Gabriel Vázquez SJ (1549–1604), and Francisco de Araújo OP (1580–1664). It should also be noted that Arriaga does not distinguish between the views that beings of reason as extrinsic denominations are real (probably Durand and others) and that as extrinsic denominations they are non-real (probably Vázquez, Araújo and others). The latter thinkers would not subscribe to the reduc-

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28 Fonseca, P., *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros*, vol. 2, Coloniae, Sumpt. Lazari Zetzneri, 1615 [*1589, Rome*], p. 465–468. He seems to subscribe to the view in section 4 (l. 5, c. 7, q. 6) but the following section 5 takes a different perspective.

29 Vázquez, G., *Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Primam Partem ... tomus secundus ... editio novissima*, Apud Petrum et Ioannem Belleros, Antwerpiae 1625, p. 32 (d. 115, c. 2, n. 2).

tionist view that “taken precisely” beings of reason are “real in themselves”. (Reductionism, i.e. the view that beings of reason are real beings, will come up again below, in the discussion of self-contradictory beings.31)

Having rejected the extrinsic denomination view Arriaga concludes that a being of reason is to be defined as “that which has merely objective being in the intellect”.32 This definition, made popular by Suárez, became standard in the Jesuit order, and in 1653 even mandatory, although its interpretation continued to be interpreted in widely different senses.33 An example of a being of reason that Arriaga gives at this point already indicates that his interpretation draws on Hurtado – “the man is irrational”. The irrational man has no being in reality (a parte rei) but he is conceived as having, hence he has only objective being in the intellect and is a fictitious being of reason (ens rationis fictum).34

Further details of Arriaga’s conception will emerge further on. But before we go on, let me report here about Arriaga’s short polemics against François de Bonne Espérance (Franciscus Bonae Spei) OCD (1617–1677), a Belgian Carmelite, that he included in the revised edition of his Cursus.35 Bonne Espérance and his Commentarii tres in universam Aristotelis philosophiam published in 1652 seems to be one of Arriaga’s favourite opponents.36 His discussion of beings of reason is brief but somewhat independently-minded. He openly argues that (by now) the well-established definition of a being of reason, as that which is objectively only in the intellect, is flawed. When I assert, for instance, “The identity between the goat and the stag is impossible” the subject, i.e. the identity, exists objectively only in the intellect, is flawed. When I assert, for instance, “The identity between the goat and the stag is impossible” the subject, i.e. the identity, exists objectively only in the intellect but still I do not make up anything since I am not thinking that something is otherwise than it is. Hence I am not making a being of reason. It follows

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31 In: Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. 46–47, I have labeled as “ultrarealist” the view that beings of reason, since they are extrinsic beings, are a sort of real beings; but this label would better be reserved for the view that although beings of reason are irreducible to real beings (or to real extrinsic denominations), they are nevertheless mind-independent.

32 “Ergo ens rationis a nobis solum accipitur in praesenti pro eo, quod habet tantum esse obiective in intellectu, id est, quod tantum habet cognoscil.” Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 6-7).

33 Knebel tentatively traces the origin of this definition to the passing remark of Hervaeus Natalis OP (d. 1323) (On Second Intentions, Trans. J. P. Doyle, Milwaukee, Marquette 2008, p. 362) and gives a long list of authors who endorsed it before 1653 (Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit., p. 358). Bartolommeo Mastri OFMConv. (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto OFMConv. (c. 1600–1676) point out that it is „sentencia inter Recentiore receptissima, quibus praecedit Suarez“. Mastrius, B., Disputaciones in Organum Aristotelis. Venetiis, Typ. Marci Ginamni 1646 [1639], p. 298 (d. 3, q. 2, n. 13).

34 Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 6-7).

35 Arriaga discusses Bonne Espérance first in section 2 but the discussion more appropriately belongs here.

that a being of reason should rather be defined as that which is possible but thought of as impossible, or conversely. Some philosophers might frown at this definition, because it contains a disjunction, Arriaga says. But he does not reject it for this reason and it can be easily fixed anyway: “a being of reason is that concerning the possibility of which the intellect errs”. Nevertheless, he rejects even this revised definition – because it dissents from the majority opinion. Such a rejection looks surprising since Arriaga does not usually appeal to an authority and here he substantially agrees with Bonne Espérance. Both follow Hurtado in holding that beings of reason are falsehoods, although (as we shall see) Arriaga’s view is unrestricted, including possible non-actual items (“Peter is running <he is not>”), whereas Bonne Espérance restricts falsehoods to the modal ones (“Peter is irrational”). Thus, the explanation for Arriaga’s shallow rejection of Bonne Espérance’s definition will probably be extrinsic, namely the official requirement to teach the “objectively only in the intellect” definition.

Arriaga’s section 1 remained unchanged between the first and the last edition. As we have seen, at this point his discussion is derived from Hurtado. With respect to the nature of beings of reason, Arriaga joins Hurtado in his subversive revisionist campaign against the Baroque scholastic consensus on beings of reason, but his own contribution to the debate is negligible. As we shall see, more substantial will be his discussion of their existence in the next section.

2. Existence: Whether there are beings of reason?

Arriaga’s discussion of the existence of beings of reason opens with the confident claim that it is quite certain that they exist, in spite of “many authors” who completely deny them, such as Francisco Vallés (1524–1592), and of

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37 “Bonam-spem ... [d]efinit ergo ens rationis, quod, cum sit possibile, concipitur impossibile, vel e contrario, cum sit impossible in se, concipitur possibile. ... posset hoc modo mens eius Authoris sine disjunctione explicari: ens rationis est, circa cuius possibilitatem errat intellectus ... Reicienda ergo est ea definitio, quia ... discedit a Communi, cum fere omnes dicant illud esse ens rationis, quod solum habet esse in intellectu” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1010 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n 14-15).

38 In our context Bonne Espérance does not mention Arriaga’s view about this matter neither approvingly nor disapprovingly. He is well aware of Arriaga’s work (as we may read in the Prolog) but his explicitly mentioned opponents with respect to beings of reason include only Thomas Compton Carleton SJ (1592–1666), Francisco Oviedo SJ (1602–1651) and John Punch OFM (c. 1599–1661). In some of his claims he is closer to Hurtado than Arriaga. He argues, for instance, that chimeras, when considered as impossible, are not strictly speaking beings of reason, since we think what is true of them.

39 Vallés was a physician and philosopher who taught at Alcalá. His argumentation against beings of reason can be found in Controversiarum naturalium ad tyrones pars prima, Compluti, Andreas
Arriaga (and Hurtado) against the Baroque Mainstream

some who think that it “cannot be convincingly shown that they exist and that the view of Vallés is probable enough.” Arriaga then sets out to prove the point and to deal with various objections of which the main concerns the possibility of “false acts without fictitious objects”. The section also contains two debates, one against Richard Lynch SJ (1610–1676), an Irish student of Hurtado, and another against Bonne Espérance, that we have already dealt with. We shall see that whereas his discussion about the nature of beings of reason was rather disappointing, here he deals with the issues, especially in his replies to various objections, with some originality.

Arguments for beings of reason
There are two arguments for the existence of beings of reason that Arriaga presents. The main one, which we might call the falsehood argument, consists in the observation that there are false acts of the intellect. In the first edition he puts it as follows:

This is how I show [the existence of beings of reason]: First, it is not possible to deny that some acts are false and some are true. Secondly, it is not possible to deny that the false acts are false because their object is not in reality as they affirm it, and the true acts are true because their object is in reality as they affirm. ... Thus, some objects are not in reality. 

ab Angulo, 1563, p. 18–19 (n. 10). Besides Vallés, closer to home, it would be more appropriate to enlist Hurtado’s colleague Valentín de Herice SJ (1572–1636) who taught theology in Valladolid and Salamanca and whom Hurtado calls synmagister meus (Scholasticon). Herice argues in favor of: “Secunda sententia negat intellectui hanc virtutem quasi e effectricem entis rationis et arbitratur, quidquid respondet ex parte objecti, distinctumque est ab actu intellectus, esse in se ens reale” (Quatuor Tractatus in I. Partem S. Thomae, Pamplonae, Caroli, 1624, p. 174). Although Herice’s views on beings of reason differ from Hurtado’s they both take fallibilism as the point of departure: “cum intellectus humanus constringit ens rationis, id efficit per iudicium falsum.”

Ibid., p. 175.

40 Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 1, n. 7).


42 “Quod sic ostendo: nam primum negari nequit actus aliquos esse falsos, aliquos esse veros. Secundo negari nequit, actus falsos ideo esse falsos, quia objectum illorum non est a parte rei, sicut per ipsos affirmatur: veros autem ideo esse veros, quia objectum eorum ita est, ut per ipsos affirmatur. ... Ergo alicui actus sunt, quorum objecta non sunt a parte rel.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus, 1632, op. cit., p. 884 (d. 6, s. 2, n. 8).
The paragraph was dropped in the revised edition, perhaps as Arriaga realized greater complexity of the debate and the dissent grew; the passage was explicitly criticized by Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (O.Cist.) (1606–1682) in 1654. In the revised edition he does not formulate the argument in the same simple and straightforward way, but the point remains. He argues: Let us take, for instance, the statement “the horse is rational”. The object of this act is the rational horse. Of course, such a fictitious horse cannot exist (dari) really (a parte rei), but it is known (cognoscitur) by our intellect, it is an object for our intellect and thus it has merely objective being in our intellect. Examples such as these are called “beings of reason” and they clearly occur. If anybody would like to deny this, the dispute would be verbal and one would have to go “against experience, reason and the consensus even of rustics.” The falsehood argument is not original. It can be found in Hurtado, even with the same reference to just one opponent, Vallés. We shall be occupied with this argument when we come to objections.

Arriaga’s other argument for beings of reason, which might be called ontological, was also taken over, this time from Suárez to deny beings of reason leads to self-contradiction because the existence of beings of reason is nothing else than knowing or apprehending them, so by the very negating them one apprehends them. Otherwise one would be denying one knows not what, which is ridiculous. The argument seems to be considered sound by most scholastics of the time. As far as I know it was first criticized by Caramuel in 1681.

False acts without fictitious objects?
There are various objections against beings of reason that Arriaga considers, one of which goes against the core of the falsehood argument:

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45 See e.g. Novotný, D., *Ens rationis*, op. cit., p. 115.

46 Ibid., p. 51.


You might object that our intellect intentionally connects the true and real rationality, which it knows from other things, with a horse, without conceiving in this act something fictitious. Thus, it is not necessary [to posit] some beings of reason which would correspond to this fiction-making act from the part of the object.49

We see that the opponent admits that there are false mental acts, but denies that there are any special fictitious objects corresponding to them. A false act, such as “the horse is rational”, does not need any fictitious irrational horse as its object; all we need are the real component objects rationality and horse. Arriaga presents three replies to this objection:

(1) When I say “the horse is rational” I do not predicate of the horse the rationality of (let’s say) Peter but the rationality which is neither Peter’s, nor Mary’s, nor of any other (actual or possible) individual. I predicate some other rationality, similar to the real one, but which is made up.50

(2) Even if components of beings of reason were real, their union is definitely not, since it does not exist in reality and hence it is fictitious.51 To reply that the real unity as such is real because it exists in other things will not do. First, the unity of components of the being of reason is not numerically the same unity as the unity found in real things (and hence we cannot claim that it is real). Secondly, even if we wanted to grant that it is real, it is claimed to be here and now, which is not the case. Hence it is not real but fictitious.52

(3) We need to distinguish two senses of intentional unification/identification. In the formal sense, we do not affirm the unity of the two items but we instead take them confusedly, and thus do not distinguish them. This happens, for instance, in case of thinking of universals. Here no being of reason is produced and these mental acts are true, although formally speaking they unite things incapable of being unified. In the objective sense, we explicitly apprehend or affirm the unity of the two

49 “Respondebis primo, intellectum nostrum veram et realem rationalitatem, quam in alis rebus cognoscit, connectere intentionaliter cum equo, quin per eum actu alienum fictum concipient, ergo non est necessarium tale ens rationis, quod correspondeat ex parte objecti actui fingenti.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 17).

50 Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 17).

51 “Secundo ... quia licet extrema sint realia, unio tamen affirmata non est realis, sed ficta ... quia licet extrema dentur a parte rei seorsim, non tamen identificata inter se, ergo taliis identitas est ficta, ergo est ens rationis.” Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n.19).

52 Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 19).
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incompatible things. Here we do affirm a unity and thus our act is false, because there does not exist any such unity. This unity is fictitious and called a being of reason in the proper sense.\textsuperscript{53}

In all of these replies Arriaga takes as the point of departure strong nominalistic rejection of universals. (1) There is no rationality as such; in predicking rationality of a horse and of a man I predicate two distinct rationalities. (2) There is no unity as such; the (falsely asserted) unity of rationality with a horse and (truly asserted) unity of rationality with a man are two distinct unities. (3) There are two irreducible kinds of unification; the formal works by confusion and yields universals (i.e. they are not the result of abstraction), whereas the objective works explicitly and yields non-existent fictions. All of these replies leave unmoved those who do not reject universals as Arriaga does. His nominalism also plays pivotal role in the debate with Lynch to which we now turn.\textsuperscript{54}

The debate with Lynch

In 1654 Lynch published his \textit{Universa philosophia scholastica}, where he defended reductionist view that beings of reason are “nothing but an aggregate of real entities”\textsuperscript{55} Arriaga reports:

Fr. Lynch ... strongly defends the view that the being of reason is nothing more than an aggregate of real entities ... and an essentially false (mental) act by which the true identity is applied to them. He works to establish that all parts of some complex are real, while the complex remains fictitious.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 19-21).

\textsuperscript{54} Arriaga’s underlying nominalism in this context was noticed by Caramuel, who says that “tota haec Replica nascitur ex quodam gravissimo errore ... [in the margin] Arriaga negat omnia universalia, etsi se illa admittere dicat” (\textit{Metalogica}, op. cit., p. 72). For Arriaga’s systematic exposition of universals, see Sousedík, S., Arriagas Universalienlehre. In: Saxlová, T. – Sousedík, S., \textit{Rodrigo de Arriaga (†1667)}, op. cit., p. 41-49. Surprisingly, Mastri and Belluto are impressed by Arriaga’s defense of fictitious objects with the help of these nominalistic arguments and approvingly refer to him. See Novotný, D., \textit{Ens rationis}, op. cit., p. 141.


\textsuperscript{56} “Pater Lynceus ... fortissime defendit ens rationis nihil penitus aliud esse, quam aggregatum ex entibus realibus ... et actu reali essentialiter falso, quo identitas vera his extremis applicatur. Est autem totus, ut probet, posse omnes partes alcius complexi esse reales, et tamen complexum esse fictum.” Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 9). Lynch’s formula: “ens rationis, quamvis de eo affirmari possit non esse ens reale, tamen non est, aliquid adaequate distinctum a complexione plurium entium realium, sed potius est aggregatum quoddam per accidens ex extremis realibus, et actu intellectus essentialiter falso: et applicante iis veram, ac realem identitatem, quae tamen inter eis reperi nequit” Lynceus, R., \textit{Universa philosophia}, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 228. He misascribes his view to Suárez and Hurtado.
Arriaga briefly summarizes several of Lynch's arguments, two of which stand out. First, that to be objectively in the intellect is in fact just to be the act of the intellect itself, which is real. Second, that the identity of (even) incompossible entities precedes the act of the intellect, hence it is (mind-independent) and real. Arriaga is not impressed and claims that he has already dealt with similar objections in the first edition. This does not seem to be quite the case but it is true that he indicated there the distinction between the act and the object, hence undermining the first argument, and affirmed of some entities that they do not have preceding potency, hence undermining the second argument (see further below the second objection). In three points Arriaga “summarizes what he had done in the original edition but what Lynch ignored”:

- First, when we assert that there is a unity between (for instance) the goat and the stag we start with the real unity but since we claim it is where it is not, we make it fictitious.
- Secondly, if according to Lynch the whole has only real parts and it is nothing but the union of all its parts, how come the whole is not real (but impossible)? The very meaning of “The goat-stag is impossible” is unclear as both the act and its object is possible.
- Finally, although the intellect is real it is distinct from its object and so the being of reason (something non-real) can be made by it.

To these three points from the first edition Arriaga adds that the false act must be about some false (fictitious) object otherwise it could not be false. It cannot be about itself, for it is not reflexive (and anyway if it were then it

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57 “... quia esse obiective in intellectu dicit formalissime ipsum actum, quo concipitur, qui est ens reale.” Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 8).
58 “Denique, quia identitas hominis et equi, quam nos fingimus, antecedit actum intellectus, ergo est ens reale.” Ibid., p. 1009 (d.7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 8).
59 Ibid., p. 1009-10 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 10).
60 Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 8-9).
61 Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 9).
62 “Denique ergo non capio, quid velimus dicere, dum asserimus, Hirco-cervus repugnat, si omnia, quae per illam vocem significamus sunt possibilia, igitur aliquid ibi ex parte obiecti repugnans signifício, non autem ipsum actum quo id dico, quia ille est ens reale et realissimum, ac verissimum. ... non illius actus obiecta, quia et haec sunt possibilia iuxta hunc Authorem. Quid ergo, quaeo, per illum actum attingo, quod repugnet?” Ibid., p. 1009 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 9-10).
63 “Tertio ... intellectum non facere ens rationis, quasi se ipsum formaliter ... sed habendo pro obiecto aliquid distinctum a se.” Ibid., p. 1009-10 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 10).
64 “Primum fuit, quod saltem in existentia eius identitatis in hoc loco debet intervenire obiectum fictum, et ..., quod ipse tradit, ... ens rationis debere fieri actu falso ... Sic argumentor:
would be about some real entity and hence not false but true). So where does its falsity come from? To say that from applying unity where it is not will not do unless one concedes that this unity is fictitious. This unity cannot be real:

[W]hen I conceive the identity between the goat and the stag, I do not conceive some real identity but rather a fictitious unity, therefore [the false act is about some false fictitious object]. I demonstrate the antecedent clearly, because I do not receive the identity from any real entities in the intellect. [If somebody disagrees] may he, please, tell me from which ones [I would do so]? Not even when I mistakenly make up something, I am so stupid as to judge: the numerically same real identity, which is between, e.g. the animality and the rationality of Peter, is also the numerically same as between the goat and the stag; I know that [what is] numerically one and the same cannot be taken from its real relata, which it connects; hence I conceive or make up some other unity, which is distinct, and this one I place into the goat-stag.

We see again that Arriaga’s defence of the irreducibility of beings of reason to (aggregates) of real beings assumes his nominalistic rejection of universals. What he seems to suggest here is that the identity of the animality and the rationality in Peter is numerically different from the identity of the goat and the stag in the goat-stag. Realists would agree that these identities numerically differ but why shouldn’t they? We do not predicate numerically the

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65 “Non habet se reflexe, quia supra se non reflectit, et vero si se haberet, esset verus.” Ibid., p. 1010 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 10).
66 “…non habet pro obiecto equum, quia hic est alicuius a parte rei existentis; non hominem, quia et hic existit; non unionem, quia et haec per se est realis. In quo ergo errat hic actus? unde ergo est falsus?” Ibid., p. 1010 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 11-12).
67 “Dices: quia illam unionem applicat equo et homini. Contra: eam applicat dicendo, eam esse inter illa extrema, ergo saltem existentia unionis in eo loco est ficta ... ergo necessario debet ex parte obiecti alicuius respondere fictum.” Ibid., p. 1010 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 11-12).
68 “…quando concepio identitatem inter hircum et cervum, non concipio ullam identitatem realem, sed ullam factam, ergo. Probo antecedens manifeste, quia ego non accipio per intellectum identitatem ab ulla entibus realibus. Dicat quaes mihi, a quibus? neque quando per errorem fingo alicuius, sum tam stupidus, ut iudicem: identitas illa realis eadem numero, quae est inter animalitatem et rationalitatem Petri v.g., ... illa eadem numero est inter hircum et cervum, scio enim, non posses illam numero realim abesse a suis extremis realibus, quae connectunt, ergo allam distinctam concipio seu fingo, et illam pono in hirco-cervo.” Ibid., p. 1010 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 1, n. 11-12).
same predicate of their subjects. On the contrary, predicating the animality of goats and of Peter does not involve numerically but generically the same animality (which is “individualized” within the given goat and Peter). The same holds of the identity that we predicate of humans, i.e. rational-animals, and of goat-stags.

The status of the identity (unity) of elements within self-contradictory beings, i.e. whether it is real or fictitious, and the correlated question of whether the repugnancy between these elements is internal or external, became one of the most controversial questions of late Baroque scholasticism. The debate was usually carried out under the heading “Are there beings of reason distinct from all real (even possible) beings?” John P. Doyle traces the historical background of this question to the two basic late ancient and medieval views on where to place self-contradictory beings such as the goat-stag: Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD) claims that they are beings per accidens, i.e. aggregates of real incompatible beings, whereas Averroes (1126–1198) says that they are beings as true or false, i.e. something in the mind. Alexander’s view is reductionist, whereas Averroes’s anti-reductionist. Arriaga and others represent the heirs of the view that beings of reason (understood narrowly as self-contradictory) are irreducible to and distinct from real beings, whereas Lynch and others, e.g. Tirso Gonzáles de Santalla SJ (1624–1705), represent the heirs of the view that beings of reason are reducible to and ultimately non-distinct from real beings. Growing number of authors joined the camp of reductivists. Writing within the Jesuit tradition toward the end of the nineteenth century, José J. Urrábiru SJ (1844–1904) briefly recapitulates the debate and declares reductionism to be the minority view, although “probable enough” and backed up by many

69 The status of the unity and its expression by the copula is closely related to the topics of simple apprehension and judgment. See Knebel, S. K., Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit. e.g. p. 124–130 for broader context. “Der Streit um die irrealen Gegenstände war also im Kern ein Streit um die Auffassung der Copulafunktion, zunächst im unmöglich wahren Urteil, dann im Urteil überhaupt.” Ibid., p. 128.

70 Doyle, J. P., Impossible Objects. In: On the Borders of Being and Knowing Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being, op. cit., p. 94–126. The mention of the goat-stag occurs in the commentary on Metaphysics E, which is considered not to be Alexander’s genuine work (Commentaria in Aristotelis Graeca, Ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, Reimer 1891, vol. 1, p. 448). Doyle also briefly considers earlier Aristotelian commentators that anticipate Averroes’s view.

71 We might also call them eliminativists since they agreed that there are no beings of reason (in what was agreed to be the narrowest, proper sense of the word). See Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. 34–35, 175–179, 249n9.
(Jesuit) authorities. Much of the Baroque debate of this question, due to the intricacy and complexity, remained unpublished in manuscripts.

Other objections
Arriaga considers four other objections against the existence of beings of reason. The last one, concerning the question whether there are possible beings of reason, e.g. “Peter is running <he is not>”, is presented but the answer is postponed to the next section (see below).

The first objection, which was added in the revised edition, states that if there were beings of reason a contradiction would follow. For suppose we take the negation of the being of reason. The negation does not exist in reality and hence it is a being of reason. But the negation of something cannot be that something. Hence there are no beings of reason. Many recent thinkers, Arriaga points out, trust this argument a lot. In his reply he distinguishes two meanings of “the negation of the being of reason”. First, we may mean the absence of a being of reason. In this sense (given the context) the negation of a being of reason is really “out there” before the activity of the intellect, hence we do not say of this negation that it is a being of reason. Secondly, we may mean by this expression the merely possible being of reason, i.e. the being of reason that is not actual at the moment. Although we do say of this negation that it is a being of reason, we may do so and there is no problem

72 First of all by Juan Ulloa SJ (1639–1723), but also by Herice, Lynch, Antonio Pérez SJ (1599–1649), Martín de Esparza SJ (1606–1689), Pietro Sforza Pallavicino SJ (1607–1667), Gaspar Ribadeneira SJ (1611–1675), Thyrso Gonzales, Giovanni Battista de Benedictis SJ (1641–1706), Giovanni Battista Tolomei SJ (1653–1726), Anton Mayr SJ (1673–1749) and Luis de Losada SJ (1681–1748), in addition to older authors such as Durand, Franciscus Mayronis OFM (c. 1280–1328), and Bernardinus Mirandulanus (1502–1565). As the proponents of the irreducibility view he singles out Georges de Rhodes SJ (1597–1661), Sebastián Izquierdo SJ (1601–1681), Arriaga, Silvestro Mauro SJ (1619–1687) and André Sémery SJ (1630–1717). See Urráburu, J. J. Ontologia, Avrial, Madrid 1902, p. 103–108. (First published in Valladolid in 1891). The list is, of course, not exhaustive. For instance, Jan Morawski SJ (1633–1700), a student of Esparza and a reductionist, gives other, little known names in Totius Philosophiae Principia, Posnaniae, Typ. Heredum 1666, p. 10. See also another reductionist Paul Aler SJ, Conclusiones ex universa philosopha circa quaestiones maxime controversas, Coloniae, 1692, p. 22 (in Metaphysica). The modern entry-point to the study of this debate is Doyle, J. P., Impossible Objects, op. cit. Further extensive references can be found in Knebel, S. K., Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit., p. 368–373. Reductionism has been recently defended by Novák, L., Scire Deum esse, op. cit., p. 170–187.

73 This is what Ignacio Francisco Peinado SJ (1633–1696), a defender of the irreducibility, explicitly points out (Disputationes in Universam Aristotelis Logicam, Sumpt. Collegii, Compluti 1671, p. 363). Knebel’s publication of Tirso Gonzales’s manuscripts with a highly complex discussion of this question confirms this (Erkenntnistheoretisches, op. cit. p. 85–101 and 357–433).

74 Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 27).

75 Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 22).

76 Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 22).
in it as we may also say of both the actual and the non-actual horse that it is a horse. Either way, there is no reason to reject beings of reason.

The second objection states that the being (esse) precedes the being known (cognosci) but beings of reason have no such preceding being because for them to be is to be (actually) known. Arriaga replies to the objection by denying the universal truth of the claim that the being precedes the being known, and points out that besides beings of reason we have also reflexive acts, the being of which does not precede their being known.

The third objection: suppose that the false act, e.g. “The horse is rational” is about the fictitious unity. Since the act is truly about it, it is true, which is a contradiction. Hence the false act cannot be about the fictitious unity. It can only be about the real unity, which is, however, missing in reality, thereby making the act false. There is no fictitious unity corresponding to the false act. Arriaga offers three replies:

- The first seems to complain that the objection is incoherent because it admits the existence of the fictitious unity, which is then denied. (This reply, if I understand it correctly, is quite bad since it could be applied against all indirect arguments.)
- In his second reply Arriaga denies that the (false) act about the fictitious unity would be true: the fictitious unity is brought about only by the act itself and it wasn’t there before it. Since this act is not reflexive but concerns what was before it, it is false since there was indeed no unity, fictitious nor real.
- In his third, perhaps crucial reply, Arriaga again denies that the (false) act about the fictitious unity would be true. For the act is false not because there is no real unity, but because there is the fictitious unity instead of

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77 “Secundo, respondetur, id quod tetigit Bona Spes negationem entis rationis esse solum ens rationis possibile, non actu, ens vero rationis esse actu, non esse illud quod est ipsa negatio, sed allud distinctum.” Ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 22).
78 Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 23). For Mastri’s and Belluto’s discussion of the question, see Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. 142–146.
79 Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 24).
80 “Hoc argumentum nonnullis facessit magnum negotium, sed immerso: primo enim involvit implicatiam in terminis, dicunt enim ex una parte, non dari talem unionem factam, alioque autem addunt, quod si ea affirmetur per illum actum, actus esset verus, quia datur talis unio facta, ergo iam admittis unionem factam, alioquin licet affirmaret actus, non esset verus, quia non daretur quod affirmat.” Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 24).
81 “Deinde, licet actus affirmaret dari unionem factam, adhuc non esset verus, quia illa unio facta datur formaliter per ipsum actum, qui non est supra se reflexivus; ante actum autem non datur talis unio facta, ergo esset falsus.” Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 24).
As we have seen, Arriaga deals with the existence of beings of reason in a detailed way. What is most controversial about them is their alleged complete distinction from real being, i.e. the question that has to do with their nature. In defending the anti-reductionist view Arriaga seems to proceed with an originality for which he was well known, going in his argumentation beyond Hurtado. Some of the issues concerning the nature of beings of reason will also pop up in the next section.

3. Causes: Which human powers make beings of reason?

There is a universal agreement, Arriaga claims, that beings of reason are made by intellective acts in which something is falsely thought as possible or impossible:

I hold that ... a being of reason can be made up by the intellect ... through the acts in which possible things are thought of as impossible or conversely. On this everybody agrees for obvious reasons since the object of such acts does not have other being than that of being known, thus it will be a being of reason.

The controversy is whether all false intellective acts and whether internal senses, external senses, the simple apprehension, the lower appetite and the will make beings of reason. As we shall see, departing from Hurtado’s views, Arriaga gives affirmative answer to all of these. In subsection 1 he deals with the false acts, in subsection 2 with internal senses, in subsection 3 with external senses and the rest. However, before looking at the particular faculties involved in the production of beings of reason, let me

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82 Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 25-6). In this paragraph Arriaga also points out to the irreducibility of “falsity experience”: “... dicere falsam esse veram et veram dicere esse falsam. Quid autem sit hoc dicere, respondet esse ipsam essentiam actus intellectu, cognitam experientia actuum falsorum, quae non potest ulterius explicari; sicut non potest ulterius explicari, quid sit cognoscere albedinem ...” Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 26).

83 Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 2, n. 27).

84 He also briefly discusses the question whether angels make beings of reason. The answer is why not: since it is possible for them to sin, which is worse, and it is possible for them to make errors, i.e. beings of reason. Ibid., p. 1015 (d. 7, s. 2, sb. 3, n. 45).
briefly summarize Arriaga’s main claims concerning the general features of this production.85

- When we speak of “making” (facere) or “making up” (fingere) of beings of reason, something similar to the real efficient cause, which is involved in producing real beings, is meant.86
- The resulting object, the being of reason, is to be distinguished from the act that causes it since it is impossible, whereas the act is something real and possible.87
- We cannot say more about the “fictitious being” of beings of reason. It is, as we would say today, a “primitive notion”.88
- The being of reason is made sometimes because of the perfection of the intellect (in judgments such as “The rational horse is impossible”) and other times because of its imperfection (when we make mistakes).89

Arriaga does not deal with these issues in depth and we thus turn our attention to the ones more central to him.

**False intellective acts**

Do all false acts of the intellect, even the contingent ones, such as “Peter is running <he is not>”, make up beings of reason? Since it is possible for Peter to run even when he is not, it was the standard scholastic view of the time to deny that.90 In Arriaga’s view, however, the whole disagreement about this question is verbal. We may either call a being of reason that which does not have any actual or potential being outside of the intellect (extra intellectum); in this case _Peter’s running_, while he is not running, would not be a being of reason since it has the potential being. But we may also call a being of reason that which insofar as it is cognized does not have other being than the one from the intellect (quod prout cognoscitur non habet alid esse quam per intellectum). In this case, even though _Peter’s running_ is possible,

85 Arriaga discusses this out of place at the end of section 5 dealing with the division of beings of reason.
86 Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 58).
87 “...illud autem eo modo quo est, distinguitur ab ipso actu, qui est quid possibile et reale, licet eius obiectum sit impossibile.” Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 58).
88 “Rogabis: quid ergo est illud distinctum esse obiecti? Respondeo, nihil reale, sed precise est homo fictus, equus fictus, etc. quod non potest amplius declarari, nec est quaerenda aliqua entitas in eo quod est purum nihil.” Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 58).
89 “Circa modum quo fit ens rationis ... si fiat per fictionem, oriri id ex imperfectione et limitatione potentiae, quae potest falli, ludicando illud esse cum vere non sit. Si autem fit per actus veros, ut fit a Deo, provenit ex virtute intellectus, qui suis actibus potest ad ea quae non sunt ferri, tanquam ad ea quae sunt.” Ibid., p. 1017 d. 7, s. 5, n. 58).
90 Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 28).
we think of it as actual and as actual it is only in the intellect. Hence it is a being of reason. Arriaga clearly reveals his sympathy for the latter view. In the revised edition he complains of “wild disputes” concerning this question, and of attacks against the view taken by him and Hurtado. One of the consequences of this view is that there are two genera of beings of reason, namely the possible, e.g. Peter (an actually nonexisting individual affirmed as existing), and impossible, e.g. a rational horse. Arriaga repeats the point further below, when dealing with the division of beings of reason.

**Internal and external senses**

Beings of reason, as the very name suggests, are traditionally considered to be the product of the intellect only, not of senses. Hurtado upheld this doctrine because senses do not judge something to be true or false and therefore cannot make it. Arriaga, however, does not find this reason convincing. In his view not just the intellect but also internal and even external senses can make mistakes, and therefore beings of reason, although he admits that truth and the falsity is not found in them in the strict sense of the word. But our imagination makes up chimeras and our sight presents large things, such as the Sun or the stars, much smaller than they are. These are mistakes and beings of reason. In defending the view that senses can err and are capable of making beings of reason, Arriaga explicitly departs from the opposite view of Hurtado who claims that senses cannot affirm or deny something but can only reach “accidentia sensibilia” and thus are incapable of making beings of reason. Strangely, Arriaga enlists Suárez as an ally, although he did not hold the same view. From the view that senses

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91 Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 28).
92 “Unde mirandum est nonnullos postea tam ferio de hac questione egisse et sententiam meam ac Hurtadi graver reiecssisse, cum (ut olim dixi) explicatis terminis omnes debeamus necessario convenire.” Ibid., p. 1012 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 28) For Hurtado, see e.g. Novotný, D., Ens rationis, op. cit., p. 132–133. The debate of this question was still alive at the beginning of the eighteenth century with Antonio Cordeyro SJ (1640–1722) defending the view of Hurtado and Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus cominbricensis. Ulyssipone, Deslandensiana 1704, p. 72–74, (t. 1, d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, n. 325-32).
93 Arriaga, R., Cursus philosophicus ... expurgatus, 1669, op. cit., p. 1013 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 29).
94 “Ex his colligo, etiam per actus sensus interni, immo et externi, posse fieri ens rationis: nam hi actus possunt falli, licet non in eo rigore, quo actus iudicii, ut dixi in Logica.” Ibid., p. 1013 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 31).
95 Arriaga thinks of chimeras as individuals. Ibid., p. 1014 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 3, n. 42).
96 Ibid., p. 1014 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 3, n. 35 and 38).
97 Ibid., p. 1013 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 31).
98 Ibid., p. 1013 (d. 7, s. 3, sb. 1, n. 31). Suárez only reluctantly acknowledges causal contribution of human imagination: “Dicendum est enim neque in sensibus, neque in voluntate aut appetitu formari aut esse aliquo modo propria entia rationis [Disputationes metaphysicae, d. 54, s. 2,
make beings of reason Arriaga draws the conclusion that even animals can make them, e.g. when a sheep mistakenly thinks that there is a wolf. (Arriaga defends this undoubtedly provocative thesis at some length, adding a reply to John Punch and Francisco Oviedo in the revised edition).  

**The simple apprehension**

In Arriaga's view the simple apprehension makes beings of reason as well. Those who disagree, he points out, do so because they think that beings of reason require conceiving the two as the one, and that the simple apprehension is incapable of doing this. But this argumentation is mistaken since what counts is not whether we express something by one or two terms, but whether the terms are joined by the copula. For instance, in the complex expression “Peter’s book” the terms “Peter” and “book” are not joined by “is”, which means that the object of this expression is grasped by our simple apprehension. And even simple essences can be expressed by two or more terms, e.g. “the rational animal”, and that does not make them complex. Hence even if we were not able to express beings of reason by simple terms, they could be made by the simple apprehension.

**Appetites and the will**

The common argument against the view that the will and the lower appetite make beings of reason states that these faculties already presuppose the being of reason which is made up by the intellect. Arriaga does not find this argument convincing and argues that even though appetites may tend to some apparent good (bonum apparens) based on the previous activity of the intellect that made the primary being of reason, they form their own being of reason, secondarily. It is, of course, awkward to call this item “a being of reason” – it would be more appropriate to speak of “beings of appetite” – but...
this problem and the entire question is only verbal and of minor importance, Arriaga states. Arriaga’s views about the causes of beings of reason are remarkable for his emphasis on creativity of all human powers. The previous scholastic tradition employed the term “being of reason” for something special and in the context of contemporary debates about nonexisting objects quite parochial. For Suárez, for instance, a being of reason was an impossible intentional object, for Hurtado a false proposition judged to be true, for Caramuel a self-contradictory expression. Only for Arriaga is a being of reason simply any nonexistent object that we might sense or think of. For him, unlike for Suárez or Hurtado, it was just a small step to formulate a contemporary form of the issue of nonexisting and fictitious objects, persons and worlds. Unfortunately, Arriaga did not take the step. Nevertheless, his section on the causes of beings of reason still seems to stand out as an original contribution within the scholastic context of the time.

4. God: Does he know beings of reason?

The question whether God knows beings of reason is divided by Arriaga into two, namely, whether he knows them indirectly and whether in themselves.

Does God know beings of reason indirectly? Arriaga first reports that the view denying that God knows beings of reason as made by us is ascribed by Hurtado to Vázquez. Like Hurtado, he confesses difficulties understanding...

103 “An autem fiat ens rationis per actum appetitus et voluntatis ... est quaestio de voce ... [p. 1015; d. 7, sb. 3, n. 46] ... licet ens rationis non fiat primo a voluntate ... fit tamen quasi secundo, sicut iudicium facit suo modo ens rationis, licet etiam supponatur factum ab apprehensione.” Ibid., p. 1015 (d. 7, sb. 3, n. 46).

104 His view approximates what is called today “creationism” or “artifactualism” according to which all fictional objects are “created” by their authors. Other scholastic authors – by limiting beings of reason to self-contradictory, impossible objects – seem to assume what is called today “possibilism” according to which the usual, contradiction-free fictional objects are possible (and creatable by God). For a brief overview of the contemporary debate, see Kroon, F. and Voltolini, A., Fiction. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Ed. E. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fiction/>. It is important to note, however, that the modern concept of literary fiction, which seems (as a concept) to emerge in the nineteenth century, is quite different from the scholastic concept of fiction. One of the main characteristics of fiction in the modern sense is that the question of truth or falsity in the real world does not even arise. We do not think that authors writing fiction produce truths or falsehoods about the real world, they do not even intend to do so. See Rescher, N., Imagining Irreality: A Study of Unreal Possibilities. Chicago, Open Court 2003, p. 239–256.

105 For other Baroque views on the role of the imagination in the production of beings of reason, see Doyle, J. P., Beings of Reason and Imagination. In: On On the Borders of Being and Knowing Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being, op. cit., p. 151–166.

106 Arriaga’s reference to Hurtado’s textbook shows that he worked with the first edition from 1615, and not the revised one from 1624. Hurtado’s views on this question, however, did not...
how this view can be defended since, if God knows everything, including all human acts, some of which concern chimeras, then God knows them\textsuperscript{107}. This does not imply that he makes them up. Although God conceives what is not, i.e. beings of reason, he does not affirm their existence. Hence he does not make them up but rather destroys them\textsuperscript{108}. For in order to make something up it is not sufficient just to think of something impossible. It is also necessary to affirm its existence\textsuperscript{109}.

Does God know beings of reason in themselves? Arriaga’s answer is affirmative again. God knows, for instance, that the “rational horse is impossible” and this he knows independently of humans\textsuperscript{110}. Hence he knows beings of reason in themselves. This straightforward answer, however, seems to suggest that God is involved in some suspicious activity of making things up (\textit{fingere}). Hence Arriaga emphasizes that one needs to distinguish two meanings of “to make a being of reason”: in the sense of \textit{fingere} (which presumably amounts to making a mistake) and in the sense of \textit{dare esse cognitum}. It is the former, not the latter sense in which God makes beings of reason\textsuperscript{111}. In this sense even we can make beings of reason without being incriminated in making errors\textsuperscript{112}.

In the revised edition Arriaga places at the beginning of the section a brief criticism of Bonne Espérance. According to him, God not just knows but makes beings of reason, for instance by thinking “The fourth person of the Trinity is impossible” or “The view ‘God does not exist’ is false.” Since thinking of the fourth person of the Trinity or of non-existent God is to make a being of reason, God is making beings of reason. Although Arriaga

\textsuperscript{107} Arriaga, R., \textit{Cursus philosophicus … expurgatus}, 1669, op. cit., p. 1016 (d. 7, s. 4, n. 48-50).

\textsuperscript{108} “Deus ergo, licet mente concipiat id quod non est, sive entia rationis, non tamen de eo affirmat esse, sed potius negat, unde non fingit sed destruit figmentum hominis.” Ibid., p. 1016 (d. 7, s. 4, n. 51).

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 1016 (d.7s4n51). Did Arriaga forget that in his view there are also possible beings of reason? He might say that in some sense even these are impossible when we include spatio-temporal specifications. For instance, Peter’s running, while he is walking, is impossible here \textit{and now}, although as such it is possible, cf. ibid., p. 1011 (d. 7, s. 2, n. 19).

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 1016 (d. 7, s. 4, n. 52).

\textsuperscript{111} “Haec est quaestio de sola voce, de significacione scilicet verbi facere ens rationis; si enim facere dicatur idem quod fingere, certum est, a Deo non fieri …: at si facere nihil alius sonet quam dare illi esse cognitum, certum est a Deo fieri. … nam dare esse objective, nihil est aliud, quam dare illi cognosci.” Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 4, n. 55).

\textsuperscript{112} See n. 87. This is another claim from Arriaga that opens up modern perspectives on fictitious objects (see n. 102). We would not say of Gandalf that he is an error created by Tolkien. It is more plausible to say that Tolkien first gave him \textit{esse cognitum} (and then elaborated his description in many texts he wrote). Fictions are not real but they do not \textit{purport} to be, hence they are not errors.
agrees with this claim, he does not want to allow its being expressed by the statement “God makes beings of reason”, because in its usual meaning the statement would imply that God makes false acts.\footnote{Ibid., p. 1016 (d. 7, s. 4, n. 48).}

In this section, unlike the previous, Arriaga’s arguments are derived mostly from Hurtado – apart from a brief and shallow criticism of Bonne Espérance. His merely second-hand reference to Vázquez’s text indicates that he did want to spend much time on this topic.\footnote{Arriaga briefly returns to the question in his Disputationes theologicae, now pointing out to some interpretative difficulties with what Vázquez says (“dubie loquitur”) and discussing some interesting examples of beings of reason that God knows independently of humans, such as “Ens rationis est aliquid fictum ab intellectu repugnans existere” and “Si equus esset homo, esset rationalis.” Referring to the debate from Cursus philosophicus he says that “fuseque reieci aliquas Patris Vázquez solutiones”. (Disputationum theologicarum in Primam Partem ... Tomi duo, editio novissima caeteris correctior, Sumpt. Laurentii Anisson, Lugduni, p. 191–192). This is an overstatement not just with respect to what Arriaga says of Vázquez. The entire section is rather short and disappointing. We may contrast Arriaga’s few paragraphs, for instance, with the long and subtle discussion of the Peruvian Ildefonso de Peñafiel SJ (1594–1657), Theologia scholastica naturalis ... editio nova, tomus secundus, Sumpt. Joannis Antonii Huguetan, Lugduni 1678, p. 37–78. For Peñafiel, see Pretell García, M., La filosofía de Ildefonso de Peñafiel. In La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII. Ed. J. C. Ballón Vargas. Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico de la UNMSM, Lima 2011, p. 525–572.}

5. Division: How many kinds of beings of reason are there?

Concerning the traditional division of beings of reason into the negation, the privation and the relation, Arriaga openly declares that it is insufficient because it excludes impossible chimeras and possible (mistaken) non-existents such as “non-existent running affirmed as existing” (\textit{cursus non existens affirmatus existens}).\footnote{Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 57).} It is better to divide beings of reason into the impossible (chimerical), and the possible.\footnote{Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 57).} Both are then subdivided into as many \textit{genera} as there are real beings, in fact even more as some genera can be made up.\footnote{Melius ergo primo potest dividi in ens rationis impossibile, seu chimaericum, ut v.g. equus rationalis, homo hinnibilis, alius Deus ab hoc, etc. et in ens rationis possibile, ut cursus Petri non existens, affirmatus tamen existens.” Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 57).} Negations and privations as they are in reality are not beings of reason.\footnote{Adverte, negationem et privationem esse entia rationis, quando per modum formae iudicantur, alias vero sunt ante intellectum ... de quo fusius in Physica. Ibid., p. 1017 (d. 7, s. 5, n. 58).}
nothing original nor creative in revising the division in light of previous considerations.

**Conclusion**

As with other great Baroque authors the significance of Arriaga's theory of beings of reason is hard to assess as we need to take into consideration the complex web of explicit or implicit intertextual references. It seems clear at this point that although he tacitly presupposes the conceptual and methodological background created by Suárez, it is clearly Hurtado's work that he develops. However, he is by no means his slavish follower but introduces some important modifications whenever he can. His most interesting contribution probably concerns the broadening of the concept of beings of reason, in that they are items made by the simple apprehension, not just by false judgments (contra Hurtado), and they can be imagined or perceived both by internal and external senses (contra everybody else). He also engages in various disputes, especially with Lynch and Bonne Espérance. The debate with Lynch concerning the irreducibility of beings of reason to real beings was considered of such importance that Caramuel carefully analyses it twelve years later in his *Leptotatos*. Arriaga's other distinctive views and arguments were discussed by later scholastics, but seem to have found hardly any followers.

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SUMMARY
In 1632 Rodrigo de Arriaga, an important Baroque scholastic thinker, published a textbook in philosophy, of which the last revised and extended edition was published in 1669. Arriaga develops in it a peculiar theory of beings of reason, drawing on Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, according to which beings of reason are that which is expressed by false judgments. It is a theory quite different from the classical theories held by Francisco Suárez, the Thomists and the majority of Scotists on the one hand, and reductive theories held by Richard Lynch and a growing number of later Baroque authors on the other. In this paper I analyse Arriaga’s theory and deal with the topics of nature, existence, causes, and division of beings of reason.

Keywords: Rodrigo de Arriaga, beings of reason, Richard Lynch, François de Bonne Espérance (Franciscus Bonae Spei)